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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY, : Case No. 950312-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules is contained in this 
brief or Addendum A: 
Rule 18(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 18 (e) , Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 18(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
refusing to ask Appellant's requested voir dire questions 
regarding any biases against the use of marijuana and jurors7 
beliefs regarding the concept of "free agency"? 
Standard of Review: "Although a trial judge has some 
discretion in limiting voir dire examinations, State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), that discretion should be 
liberally exercised in favor of allowing counsel to elicit 
information from prospective jurors. [citations omitted] 
Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on the right of 
counsel to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes 
and biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 
'would not have supported a challenge for cause.7 [citation 
omitted]." State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1988); see 
also State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
admitting the marijuana evidence where the State failed to 
establish a complete chain of custody and other testimony 
suggested that the evidence might not be in substantially the 
same condition as when the crime was committed? 
Standard of Review: Various cases consider whether a 
trial judge abused his discretion in determining whether to 
reverse a conviction based on a claim that the prosecution did 
not adequately establish the chain of custody. See State v. 
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme 
Court decisions in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), and State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), suggest, however, that the issue of 
whether the trial court erred in admitting an item of evidence is 
a question of law which should be reviewed for correctness. 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
1. Requested Voir Dire 
After the judge had completed his voir dire, he asked, 
"Does the defense have any further questions?" Record cite 
number ("R.") 233. Defendant/Appellant Kenneth Nolan Shrewsbury 
("Shrewsbury") responded affirmatively. R. 233. The judge then 
held an on-the-record discussion outside the presence of the 
jury. R. 233. During that discussion, Shrewsbury requested that 
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the following questions be presented to the potential jurors: 
Question 1: "Do you believe that an 
individual may use marijuana?" 
Question 2: "Do you believe that there 
are times which may, under certain circumstances, 
warrant flight from an officer of the law? If 
so: under what possible circumstances?" 
Question 3: If in privacy, an individual 
is using marijuana, do you believe that any 
person or persons are offended? If so, in what 
way?" 
R. 234-35. The trial judge refused to ask the questions. 
R. 234-35; see Addendum B for portions of transcript preserving 
this issue. By specifically requesting that the trial judge ask 
these questions, Shrewsbury preserved this issue for appellate 
review. See State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App. 
1991); Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. Chain of Custody 
When the State initially moved to admit Exhibits 2, 6, 7, 
and 8, the trial judge asked standby counsel whether he had any 
objection. Standby counsel stated that he had no objection. 
R. 273. The trial judge did not ask Shrewsbury whether he had an 
objection to the admission of those items. R. 273. When the 
State moved for admission of Exhibit 3, standby counsel stated 
that he had no objection. R. 277. The trial judge stated that 
Exhibit 3 was admitted. R. 277. Standby counsel immediately 
stated that they were assuming that the chain would be completed. 
R. 277. At that point, standby counsel clarified that Shrewsbury 
objected to the admission of any of the exhibits until the chain 
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was connected on each exhibit. Standby counsel stated, "We 
would object subject to connecting up with the chain on all 
these." R. 277. 
Later, standby counsel stated "no objection" when the 
State moved to admit the scales. R. 278. The trial judge did 
not readmit Exhibits 2, 6, 7, and 8, even though standby counsel 
stated the chain of custody objection. 
When Shrewsbury was cross-examining Jennifer Angus, the 
criminalist who analyzed the marijuana, he stated: "What I'm 
trying to find here is some positive link that that is the 
marijuana in question concerning this case. I just don't--
there's no positive evidence of that." R. 319. 
At the close of the State's case, Shrewsbury made a 
motion to dismiss the charge of Possession with Intent to 
Distribute based in part on the inadequate chain of custody. 
R. 335. After conferring with Shrewsbury, standby counsel 
stated: 
The other objection I have to that--and this may 
have gotten a little garbled; I'm not used to 
having to talk to my client to do things, I'm 
used to doing it myself--but I believe there's 
insufficient chain established in that we haven't 
gotten the evidence from the Utah Highway Patrol 
down to the crime lab. They also accepted by 
someone else down at the crime lab, other than 
the person who testified, the materials. 
R. 335. During his own testimony, Shrewsbury indicated that he 
did not recognize the marijuana which was placed into evidence by 
the State. R. 33 0; see Addendum C for portions of transcript 
relevant to the preservation of this issue. 
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The record establishes that this issue was preserved for 
appellate review. Standby counsel withdrew his "no objection" 
statement. Even if standby counsel had not withdrawn his 
statement, the record establishes that Shrewsbury, representing 
himself pro se, objected to the admission of the marijuana based 
on the State's failure to establish the chain of custody. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated January 4, 1995, the State 
charged Shrewsbury with the following counts: Failure to Respond 
to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Marijuana) with Intent to 
Distribute, a third degree felony; Assault on a Peace Officer, a 
class A misdemeanor; and False Identity to a Peace Officer, a 
class C misdemeanor.1 R. 07-08. 
On February 28, 1995, Shrewsbury filed a "Motion to 
Represent Self at Trial." R. 45. On March 6, 1995, prior to the 
jury selection process, the trial court heard Shrewsbury's motion 
to represent himself at trial. R. 108. The trial court granted 
that motion and ordered that Robert Steele of the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association act as standby counsel at trial. R. 108. 
Prior to the jury selection, Shrewsbury also moved to 
continue the trial. The trial judge denied that motion. R. 108. 
A jury trial was held on March 6 and 7, 1995. R. 109. 
1
 The Information also charges co-defendant Melissa Lesli 
Shrewsbury with Obstructing Justice, a class B misdemeanor. R. 08. 
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The jury convicted Shrewsbury of Failure to Respond to Officer's 
Signal to Stop, False Identity to a Police Officer, and Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute. 
R. 151, 152, 154, 16 0. The jury found Shrewsbury not guilty of 
Assault on a Peace Officer. R. 153, 160. 
On April 14, 1995, the trial judge sentenced Shrewsbury. 
R. 161-64. Shrewsbury filed a Notice of Appeal on May 1, 1995. 
R. 165. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 31, 1994 at about 9:10 a.m., Trooper Martin 
Turner saw an automobile with a broken windshield and missing 
left-hand mirror. R. 254, 267. Trooper Turner activated the 
overhead lights on his vehicle. R. 254. The vehicle stopped in 
the right emergency lane and Trooper Turner parked behind the 
vehicle. R. 254. 
Trooper Turner told the driver to step out of the car. 
The trooper asked the driver his name, date of birth, and 
address. R. 255. The driver indicated his name was Donald 
Shrewsbury, gave the officer a date of birth, and indicated that 
he did not know his exact address. R. 255. The trooper then 
told the driver to get back into the vehicle. R. 255. 
Trooper Turner next approached the passenger, asked for 
identification, and asked whether she knew the name of the 
driver. R. 256. The passenger indicated that the driver was her 
uncle, Donald Shrewsbury, and that her aunt owned the car. 
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R. 256. The trooper told the passenger to also take a seat back 
in the car, then returned to his car to run a check with 
dispatch. R. 256. 
After obtaining information from dispatch, the trooper 
returned to the car and asked the driver to again step out of the 
car. R. 257. The driver drove away. R. 257. The trooper 
returned to his car, activated his siren and overhead lights, and 
followed the other car. R. 259-60. Trooper Turner continued to 
follow the vehicle until it pulled into an apartment complex, 
drove back behind the parking area, and came to a stop beside a 
retaining wall. R. 260. The trooper testified that while he was 
following the vehicle, the vehicle exceeded the speed limit and 
disregarded red lights. R. 264-65. 
Trooper Turner alerted dispatch at 9:32 a.m. that the 
driver was fleeing. R. 267. West Valley Officer James Wright 
joined the chase. R. 2 98. At 9:34 a.m., the vehicle entered the 
apartment complex. R. 268. 
After the Shrewsbury vehicle hit the retaining wall, the 
driver exited the vehicle. R. 266. Trooper Turner also got out 
of his vehicle and followed the driver through a grassy area and 
a residential street. R. 267. The trooper then lost sight of 
the driver. R. 267. At trial, Trooper Turner identified the 
driver of the vehicle as Appellant, Kenneth Shrewsbury. R. 268. 
Officer Wright observed the driver jumping out of the 
car. Officer Wright approached the passenger, removed her from 
the car, and put her on the ground and handcuffed her. R. 301. 
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He placed the passenger in his patrol car under the control of 
another officer, then joined the foot chase. R. 3 02. Trooper 
McCleeve also joined the foot search. R. 293. 
Officer Wright observed an individual begin to get on a 
bus, then run when the individual saw the officer. R. 304. 
Officer Wright pursued the individual to a fence line where there 
were three patrol units and other things blocking the individual. 
R. 305. Officer Wright testified that the person stopped and 
raised his hands, but when the officer approached, the individual 
put his hands down and pushed the officer. R. 3 05. The 
individual ran, and Officer Wright attempted to apprehend him. 
R. 306. Another officer intercepted the individual and was 
pulling the individual to the ground when Officer Wright tackled 
the individual and both officers ended up on top of the person. 
R. 307. 
Officer Gavin Cook was one of the officers who observed 
Officer Wright chasing an individual in front of the Wendy's 
restaurant. R. 322. He blocked the path of the person being 
chased, and that person turned around and headed in the opposite 
direction. R. 323. Officer Cook testified that the person 
stopped and Officer Wright tried to grab him. R. 323. The 
person twisted and pushed away from the officer and continued 
running. R. 323. The person stopped for only one or two 
seconds. R. 323. Officer Cook did not see the person raise his 
arms and did not otherwise testify to assaultive behavior by the 
person. R. 323-24. 
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Officer Cook chased the person and caught him in the 
Wendy's parking lot. R. 323. Shrewsbury was taken into custody. 
R. 269, 293. Shrewsbury was wearing a fanny pack when he was 
taken into custody. R. 270, 293. Both troopers searched the 
fanny pack and observed what appeared to be marijuana. R. 271-
72, 293. Trooper Turner searched the fanny pack and found an 
identification card which had a picture of Shrewsbury and 
contained the name "Kenneth Shrewsbury." R. 271. The trooper 
also found $272 in cash, baggies containing what appeared to the 
trooper to be marijuana, and a set of scales. R. 271-72. 
After Shrewsbury was arrested, Shrewsbury indicated that 
his right of free agency permitted the use of marijuana. R. 282. 
Shrewsbury also indicated that he did not recognize a law which 
precluded his use of marijuana. R. 282. Additionally, 
Shrewsbury indicated that he was not required to stop at the 
officer's command, based on his free agency right. R. 282. 
No one was injured during the chase and only minor property 
damage occurred. R. 284. 
The trooper put the evidence into evidence bags, filled 
out an evidence tag, sealed the bags, and put the evidence in the 
evidence locker. R. 272. He placed three individual bags into a 
larger evidence bag. He labeled the larger bag but did not 
individually label the three bags. R. 273. 
The trooper checked the contents of the baggies by 
conducting a "dust chemical test." R. 274. If such a test is 
positive, the officer submits the material to an expert for 
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analysis. R. 274. The trooper concluded that the material 
appeared to be marijuana. R. 276. 
The trooper testified that State's Exhibit 3 was also 
removed from the fanny pack and appeared to be in an identical 
condition to the item found in the pack. R. 276. The trooper 
marked the exhibit, secured it, and on his return to duty, 
entered the evidence into the evidence locker. R. 276-77. The 
trooper testified that he had an evidence locker which he used to 
secure evidence until the evidence custodian arrived. R. 277-78. 
When the evidence custodian arrives, he or she removes the 
evidence from the individual locker and puts it into the evidence 
locker. R. 278. 
Jennifer Angus, a criminalist with the Utah Crime 
Laboratory, testified that she was "requested to analyze the 
green leafy substance reported by Trooper Turner." R. 315. The 
evidence was delivered to the crime lab by Robert Humphrey of the 
Highway Patrol and signed off by Scott Smoot at the crime lab. 
R. 318-19. Neither of these people testified. Ms. Angus 
identified crushed marijuana in each of the three baggies. 
R. 316. The trooper picked up the items from the evidence locker 
on the day of trial. R. 277. 
Shrewsbury testified in narrative form. He testified 
that he believes he has a right of free agency which overrides 
statutory restrictions as long as his behavior does not cause 
harm to others. R. 326-27. He denied assaulting Officer Wright 
and testified that he merely ran into the officer as he ran. 
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R. 329-30. Shrewsbury admitted that he had marijuana but 
testified that the marijuana which was placed into evidence did 
not look like the marijuana he had. R. 331-32. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to 
ask three voir dire questions which Shrewsbury requested. These 
questions were directed toward eliciting information regarding 
jurors' biases toward the use or possession of marijuana and 
jurors' beliefs regarding the concept of free agency. The 
questions were appropriate in that they would have aided 
Shrewsbury in intelligently exercising his peremptory challenges 
and may have uncovered acknowledged bias. Because the possession 
of marijuana charge was tried with the other three charges, 
Shrewsbury should have been allowed to determine whether jurors' 
feelings about the use of marijuana would affect their ability to 
fairly assess the evidence on the other charges. In addition, 
the judge allowed Shrewsbury to pursue his "free agency" defense 
but did not give him the required tools to assess whether jurors 
would be offended by such a defense. 
The significant gap in the chain of custody of the 
marijuana evidence coupled with the evidence suggesting that such 
evidence was not in substantially the same condition as when the 
crime was committed require that the conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute be reversed. A break in the chain of 
custody occurred when Trooper Turner placed the evidence in his 
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personal locker. That gap continued until Jennifer Angus 
analyzed the marijuana evidence at the state crime lab. The 
State did not introduce testimony from the evidence custodian who 
would have received the evidence from Trooper Turner or the 
criminalist who received the evidence at the crime lab. Coupled 
with this gap in the chain is the trooper's testimony that he 
discarded the outer wrappings which he found on the marijuana. 
In addition, Shrewsbury testified that he did not recognize the 
marijuana and that the evidence did not look like the item he had 
possessed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO VOIR DIRE THE POTENTIAL 
JURORS REGARDING THEIR BIASES AGAINST MARIJUANA 
USE AND THEIR BELIEFS REGARDING FREE AGENCY. 
Shrewsbury requested that the following voir dire 
questions be presented to the jury. 
Question 1: "Do you believe that an 
individual may use marijuana?" 
Question 2: "Do you believe that there 
are times which may, under certain circumstances, 
warrant flight from an officer of the law? If 
so: under what possible circumstances?" 
Question 3: If in privacy, an individual 
is using marijuana, do you believe that any 
person or persons are offended? If so, in what 
way?" 
R. 234-35. The trial judge refused to ask the questions. 
R. 2334-35; see Addendum B. 
The purposes of voir dire examination are two-fold: 
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(1) the detection of actual bias so that appropriate challenges 
for cause can be made, and (2) the collection of information and 
data so that counsel is able to intelligently exercise peremptory 
challenges. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1988). In regard to 
the first purpose, adequate voir dire is necessary in order to 
thoroughly probe jurors' biases. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 
1059 (Utah 1984). "Voir dire is intended to provide a tool for 
counsel and the court to carefully determine, by inquiry, whether 
biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will 
interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it." 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1058. 
The Ball Court also recognized the importance of the 
other purpose of voir dire--the collection of information in 
order to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Ball, 685 
P.2d at 1058. The Court stated: 
Properly utilized, however, it may be seen that 
the peremptory challenge performs a valuable 
function in our jury system. Its efficacy is 
necessarily vitiated when a party is not 
permitted to gather enough information from 
prospective jurors in order to exercise his right 
intelligently. 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1059 (emphasis added). 
In Ball, a Driving Under the Influence prosecution, the 
Court held that the trial judge committed reversible error in 
refusing to ask potential jurors if their abstentions from 
drinking alcoholic beverages were based on religious beliefs. 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060. The Court reasoned that the question was 
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"reasonably calculated to discover any latent bias that may have 
existed." Ball, 685 P.2d at 1059. 
In Worthen, the Court emphasized that trial judges should 
liberally exercise their discretion to avoid unnecessarily 
limiting voir dire. Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845. The Court 
recognized that the fairness of a trial might depend on counsel's 
ability to uncover biases and attitudes so that counsel could 
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Id. The Court 
stated that "[a]11 that is necessary for a voir dire question to 
be appropriate is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise his 
peremptory challenges more intelligently.' [citations omitted]." 
Id. The Worthen Court concluded: 
Juror attitudes revealed during voir dire may 
indicate dimly perceived, yet deeply rooted, 
psychological biases or prejudices that may not 
rise to the level of a for-cause challenge but 
nevertheless support a peremptory challenge. 
Thus, trial counsel should be given considerable 
latitude in asking voir dire questions, 
especially in view of the fact that only counsel 
will, at the beginning, have a clear overview of 
the entire case and the type of evidence likely 
to be adduced. Voir dire should not be 
restricted to a "stark little exercise" which 
discloses little. 
Id. at 845 (emphasis added); see also State v. Hall, 797 P.2d at 
471-72 (holding that reversible error occurred where the trial 
judge did not ask the jurors whether they had a relationship with 
anyone in the county attorney's office). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also used its supervisory 
power to emphasize the need for voir dire questioning which 
exceeds that which is required by the federal constitution. See 
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State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). In James, the 
Court, in its supervisory capacity, reminded trial courts of "the 
important role that jury voir dire has in ensuring that all 
litigants in a case receive a fair and impartial jury." Id. at 
797. The Court recognized that pursuant to Mu'Min v. Virginia, 
500 U.S. 415, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991), the federal 
constitution does not require that potential jurors be questioned 
regarding the content or source of publicity to which jurors have 
been exposed. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court cautioned 
trial judges "to adequately and completely probe jurors on all 
possible issues of bias, including press coverage." James, 819 
P.2d at 798. See also State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (in-depth 
questioning of jurors regarding potential bias is required). 
In this case, Shrewsbury clearly preserved his request 
that the three questions be asked. R. 234-35. The first and 
third questions were directed toward discovering any biases or 
prejudices the jurors might have regarding the use or possession 
of marijuana. These questions were important to the exercise of 
peremptory challenges as well as to the detection of any actual 
bias. 
While the use of marijuana is illegal, individuals have 
different feelings about people who use or possess marijuana. 
Some people have a very strong negative view of anyone who uses 
or possesses marijuana. Other people recognize that possession 
of marijuana is illegal but do not have strong negative feelings 
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toward someone who uses or possesses marijuana. Still others 
believe that the use and possession of marijuana should be legal. 
The State charged Shrewsbury in a single Information with 
four different counts. Only one of those counts related to the 
possession of marijuana. Because the other counts were being 
tried with the possession count, it was important for Shrewsbury 
to find out whether any of the potential jurors had strong biases 
against the use or possession of marijuana. 
Questions directed toward eliciting information from 
jurors regarding their feelings about marijuana use are similar 
to questions as to whether a juror's abstention from alcohol is 
based on his or her religious beliefs. See Ball, 685 P.2d at 
1059-60. The questions regarding marijuana use were "reasonably 
calculated to discover any latent [or acknowledged] bias that may 
have existed among [the jurors]." Id. at 1059. These questions 
would have aided Shrewsbury in intelligently exercising his 
peremptory challenges. In addition, they might have uncovered 
actual bias which would have required the removal of a juror for 
cause. 
Questions 2 and 32 were directed toward exposing any 
juror bias regarding Shrewsbury's "free agency" beliefs. "Free 
agency" is a concept which is arguably found in some religions. 
This concept is apparently found in the Mormon religion, which is 
2
 Question three would have uncovered information regarding 
jurors' biases toward the use of marijuana and their feelings 
regarding the concept of "free agency." 
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the predominant religion in Utah. See R. 327, 360-61. The 
concept of "free agency" is also arguably grounded in Utah 
constitutional provisions. See Instruction Number 13, a copy of 
which is contained in Addendum D. Questions 2 and 3 were 
reasonably calculated to elicit information regarding jurors' 
beliefs as to whether an individual has a free agency right to 
act in certain ways despite laws prohibiting such conduct. 
Individuals hold varying beliefs regarding the extent to 
which the government is able, or should be able to control the 
actions of citizens. In this case, the trial judge permitted 
Shrewsbury to pursue his "free agency" defense in his testimony 
and argument. R. 326-27, 354-65. The judge also gave an 
instruction which touched on that defense. See Instruction 
Number 13. Trooper Turner testified that Shrewsbury talked about 
his free agency theory after arrest. R. 282. 
Because the jury was informed of Shrewsbury's free agency 
beliefs and the trial judge allowed Shrewsbury to pursue his 
"free agency" defense, Questions 2 and 3 were essential for an 
informed exercise of Shrewsbury's peremptory challenges. In 
addition, the questions may have uncovered acknowledged bias held 
by jurors against individuals who harbor such beliefs. 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
ask the requested voir dire questions. All three questions were 
reasonably calculated to uncover acknowledged or latent bias and 
were therefore appropriate. 
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POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH A 
SUFFICIENT CHAIN OF CUSTODY TO PERMIT 
INTRODUCTION OF THE MARIJUANA EVIDENCE. 
Before evidence can be admitted, the proponent of the 
evidence must lay the proper foundation for such admission. 
State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1984) . The evidence 
"must be identified as the object in question and there must be 
shown a chain of custody." State v. Petralia, 521 P.2d 617, 623 
(Ariz. 1974) . The party seeking to introduce the evidence must 
convince the trial court that 
the proposed exhibit is in substantially the same 
condition when introduced into evidence as it was 
when the crime was committed. When the evidence 
has passed through several hands, circumstances 
surrounding chain of possession are relevant in 
making this assessment. State v. Madsenf 28 Utah 
2d 108, 498 P.2d 670 (1972); State v. Crook, 98 
Idaho 383, 565 P.2d 576 (1977). See also 29 Am. 
Jur. 2d Evidence, § 774 at 846 (1967). 
Bradshaw, 680 P.2d at 1039. 
In Bradshaw, the court held the trial judge did not err 
in admitting marijuana which was mailed to the state chemist for 
analysis. Id. The court determined that "mailing a narcotic to 
a central laboratory does not necessarily constitute a break in 
the chain of custody," and the sample was identified and was 
otherwise "traceably transferred from party-to-party." Id. Most 
importantly, the defendant did not present evidence suggesting 
that the marijuana had been altered, tampered with or substituted 
during mailing. Id. 
The chain of custody requirement exists to protect 
against the admission of evidence that has been altered, tampered 
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with or substituted or which is not the evidence actually 
gathered by the officers in a specific case. Id.; State v. 
Watson, 684 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1984). The "chain of custody 
doctrine has its greatest force where the physical evidence in 
question is fungible or subject to alteration." Id. Controlled 
substances can be easily altered and are susceptible to 
substitution. Petralia, 521 P.2d at 623. The chain of custody 
requirement therefore has its greatest force and importance in a 
case such as the present case where the challenged evidence is a 
controlled substance. See Petralia, 521 P.2d at 623; Watson, 684 
P.2d at 40 (favorably citing Petralia, 521 P.2d at 623). 
In the present case, a significant break in the chain of 
custody of the marijuana evidence coupled with testimony 
suggesting that the evidence had been altered or substituted 
demonstrates that the marijuana evidence should not have been 
admitted at trial. Trooper Turner testified that he found what 
appeared to be marijuana in Shrewsbury's fanny pack. R. 271-72. 
He removed the items from the fanny pack and took them to the 
evidence room at the Highway Patrol office. R. 277. The trooper 
placed the evidence in his personal evidence locker and did not 
see it again until the day of trial. R. 277. After evidence is 
placed in a trooper's personal locker, an evidence custodian 
removes it from the personal locker and places it in the main 
locker. R. 278. 
Jennifer Angus, the criminalist who analyzed the 
evidence, testified that her records showed that the evidence was 
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delivered to the crime lab by Robert Humphrey of the Utah Highway 
Patrol. R. 318-19. Her records also showed that Scott Smoot 
signed for the evidence when it was delivered to the crime lab. 
R. 318-19. The State did not introduce testimony from the 
evidence custodian, Robert Humphrey or Scott Smoot. 
A gap in the chain of custody occurred when Trooper 
Turner placed the evidence in his personal locker. That gap 
continued until Ms. Angus examined the evidence at the crime lab. 
There is no information as to how the evidence was secured, 
labeled, transported, or identified after it was placed in 
Trooper Turner's locker. 
This case contrasts with Bradshaw since a complete break 
in the chain occurred. In Bradshaw, the mailing of the evidence 
was a "weak link" but did not create a break or gap in the chain 
as occurred in this case. A "weak link in the chain" goes to the 
weight of the evidence and does not demonstrate that the judge 
erred in admitting the evidence. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d at 103 9. By 
contrast, a gap in the chain which demonstrates that the evidence 
is not "in substantially the same condition when introduced as it 
was when the crime was committed" impacts on the admissibility of 
the evidence. See Id. 
The gap in the chain in the present case rendered the 
marijuana evidence inadmissible. Evidence was introduced which 
demonstrated that the material contained in Exhibits 2, 6, 7, and 
8 had been altered or removed from the original containers by 
officers at the scene. R. 281, 287-88. Trooper Turner discarded 
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the original containers of some of the marijuana and the scales. 
R. 281. He did not individually label the three bags of 
marijuana. R. 273. Shrewsbury testified that he did not 
recognize the exhibits and they did not appear to be the same 
material he had possessed. R. 331. This evidence suggesting 
that the evidence had been altered or substituted coupled with 
the significant gap in the chain rendered the marijuana evidence 
inadmissible. 
The testimony reflects a gap in the chain of custody from 
the time Trooper Turner dropped off the items at his personal 
locker until Ms. Angus analyzed the items at the crime lab. 
Considering the testimony that the original containers had been 
discarded and that the material introduced at trial was not the 
same as that which Shrewsbury possessed, the trial judge erred in 
admitting the evidence. 
The admission was prejudicial in that the marijuana 
evidence was used by the State to establish the possession 
charge. In addition, the condition and quantity of the marijuana 
evidence was used by the State to establish that Shrewsbury 
possessed marijuana "with intent to distribute." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his convictions and remand this case for a new trial. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 18. Selection of jury, 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to 
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause 
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory 
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call 
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute 
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose 
names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examina-
tion of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the 
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the 
examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit 
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or 
for the tried of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection 
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is 
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the chal-
lenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a 
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the chal-
lenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be 
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the 
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial 
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall 
direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evi-
dence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges 
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason 
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory chal-
lenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defen-
dants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of 
performing the duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be iiyured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the 
prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other rela-
tionship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict 
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil 
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a 
criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the 
particular offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, 
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a ver-
dict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defen-
dant for the act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude 
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction 
regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or 
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a 
like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant 
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party chal-
lenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted 
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or 
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror 
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate 
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and 
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alter-
nate juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and 
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a privilege of the person 
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in 
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence 
and the instructions of the court. 
ADDENDUM B 
BUT THAT IS NOT SET. IF A WITNESS IS ON THE WITNESS STAND AND I 
THINK IT'S UNFAIR TO INTERRUPT A WITNESS, WE WOULD GO TO 5:15 OR 
5:30. SOMETIMES WE MAY QUIT AT QUARTER TO 5:00. IT MAY DEPEND. 
IT MAY BE THAT COME TUESDAY EVENING, YOU MAY BE 
DELIBERATING; IF THE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO YOU, I WOULD KEEP YOU 
HERE IN THE EVENING HOURS TO DELIBERATE. ANYBODY ELSE? 
VENIREMAN LINDLEY: IF IT MEANS NOT UNTIL 
THURSDAY, THURSDAY NIGHT, I'M LEAVING ON A BUSINESS TRIP WITH 
THE POWER COMPANY. 
THE COURT: WE PLAN TO BE THROUGH BY THAT TIME. 
DOES THE STATE HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? 
MS. BYRNE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENSE HAVE ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS? 
MR. SHREWSBURY: YES, YOUR HONOR. SHOULD I 
BRING THEM TO YOU? 
THE COURT: YOU CAN BRING THEM TO ME. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: THOSE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU SEEN THESE? 
MS. BYRNE: NO. 
THE COURT: APPROACH. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
HAD IN CAMERA, OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
MS. BYRNE: MOST OF THESE SEEM TO BE GETTING OFF 
INTO PHILOSOPHY. I THINK THIS QUESTION WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. 
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"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL MAY USE MARIJUANA?" I 
THINK THAT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, LIKE--I 
THINK IF HE'S CONFRONTING--. 
THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT I WOULD INSTRUCT IN THE 
INSTRUCTIONS. IF AN OFFICER WAS VIOLATING THE LAW, THEN A 
PERSON WOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO THAT. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: AND I COULD GET A HIGHER CASE, 
I COULD GET--. 
THE COURT: BUT THAT'S NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
MS. BYRNE: AND I WOULD OBJECT TO THAT. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: JUST TO SHOW CAUSE FOR IT. 
THE COURT: THIS NO. 49, I'M GOING TO READ IT FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORD: 
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHICH 
MAY, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, 
WARRANT FLIGHT FROM AN OFFICER OF THE 
LAW? IS SO: UNDER WHAT POSSIBLE 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
AND IF YOU HAVE AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE OFFICER WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE LAW, AND YOU WERE IN FEAR OF HIM, THEN THAT 
WOULD BE SOMETHING I WOULD INSTRUCT THE JURY ON, BUT IT'S NOT 
SOMETHING I WOULD DO HERE. 
NEXT YOU'VE ASKED, IN NO. 51: 
IF IN PRIVACY, AN INDIVIDUAL IS USING 
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MARIJUANA; DO YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY 
PERSON OR PERSONS ARE OFFENDED? IF SO, IN 
WHAT WAY? 
IT'S AGAINST THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH TO USE MARIJUANA IN 
ANY WAY. THAT'S AN IMPROPER QUESTION. I DONT CARE IF IT'S 
OFFENSIVE, IT'S AGAINST THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
AND THE LAST ONE: 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE LETTER OF THE LAW AND THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAW? IF SO, WHAT IS OF GREATER 
OF IMPORTANCE TO FOLLOW? 
I WOULD BE INSTRUCTING THEM ON THE LAW. THEY MUST FOLLOW 
THE LAW AS I SO INSTRUCT THEM; I DON'T CARE ABOUT THE LETTER OR 
THE SPIRIT, THE WAY YOU'VE PUT IT. I INSTRUCT THEM ON THE LAW 
AND THEY MUST FOLLOW THE LAW AS I SO INSTRUCT THEM. 
THEREFORE I WOULD DENY YOUR RIGHT TO ASK ANY OF THOSE THREE 
QUESTIONS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS 
CONTINUED IN OPEN COURT, IN THE PRESENCE AND 
HEARING OF JURY PANEL AND DEFENDANT:) 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENDANT HAVE ANY 
FURTHER QUESTIONS? 
MR. SHREWSBURY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU BOTH THEN, SUBJECT TO THE 
DISCUSSION AT THE BENCH, PASS THE JURY FOR CAUSE? 
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ADDENDUM C 
MARTIN TURNER; DIR EXAM BY BYRNE 
11! AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2, THESE ARE MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NOS. 
2 8, 6 AND 7. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THOSE ITEMS? 
31 A I DO. 
41 Q HOW DO YOU RECOGNIZE THEM? 
5 A SPECIFICALLY JUST FROM--THEY APPEAR TO BE THE SAME 
6 THAT I PLACED IN THE BAG. I PUT--NO, I DIDN'T PUT ANY 
71 IDENTIFICATION ON THESE INDIVIDUALLY. I PLACED THESE THREE 
81 BAGS INTO THIS BAG AND DATED ON THIS BAG WHAT WAS IN HERE. 
91 Q ALL RIGHT. WHERE DID YOU FIRST SEE THOSE ITEMS 
10 MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NOS. 6, 7 AND 8? 
11 A THEY WERE IN THE FANNY PACK THAT MR. SHREWSBURY 
12 WAS CARRYING ON HIS WAIST WHEN I OPENED AND SEARCHED THAT 
13 FANNY PACK. 
14 Q DO THEY APPEAR TO BE IN THE SAME CONDITION AS THEY 
15 WERE WHEN YOU INITIALLY PLACED THEM IN THE EVIDENCE BAG? 
16 A YES. 
17 MS. BYRNE: THE STATE WOULD MOVE TO HAVE 
18|| ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WHAT WE HAVE HAD MARKED AS STATE'S 
19 EXHIBIT NOS. 2, 6, 7 AND 8 FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
20 THE COURT: ANY OBJECTION, COUNSEL? 
21 MR. STEELE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
22 THE COURT: STATE'S EXHIBIT NOS. 2, 6, 7 AND 8 ARE 
23 ADMITTED. 
24|| Q (BY MS. BYRNE) AFTER OBSERVING THESE ITEMS-OR, DID 
251 YOU TAKE THEM FROM THE FANNY PACK THAT MR. SHREWSBURY WAS 
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no 
MARTIN TURNER: DIR EXAM BY BYRNE 
ill SHREWSBURY, AND I WAS WITH HIM SEVERAL HOURS FOLLOWING THE 
2 CONTACT, AND ON MY RETURN TO DUTY I ENTERED THE EVIDENCE 
3 INTO THE OTHER LOCKER SO IT WAS IN THAT CONDITION IN THAT WAY. 
4 MS. BYRNE: THE STATE WOULD MOVE TO HAVE 
5 ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 
6 NO. 3 FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
7 MR. STEELE: NO OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. 
8 THE COURT: STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 3 IS ADMITTED. 
9 MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, WE'RE ASSUMING THAT 
10 THE CHAIN WILL BE COMPLETED ON THIS. 
11 THE COURT: WELL, YOU'RE MAKING THAT 
12 ASSUMPTION. I DON'T KNOW WHAT--. 
13 MR. STEELE: WE WOULD OBJECT SUBJECT TO 
14 CONNECTING UP WITH THE CHAIN ON ALL THESE. 
15 MS BYRNE: WELL, LET ME ASK YOU: DID YOU TAKE 
16 THIS TO THE EVIDENCE ROOM AT THE HIGHWAY PATROL OFFICE, THE 
17 EVIDENCE ROOM? 
18 A YES. 
19 Q AND DID YOU REMOVE IT FROM THERE AT ANY TIME? 
20 A IT WAS ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE LOCKER, 
21 AND I PICKED IT UP TODAY WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD PICKED IT UP 
22 OUT OF THE EVIDENCE ROOM. 
23 Q WHEN YOU TAKE IT TO THE EVIDENCE ROOM, WHAT DO YOU 
24 DO WITH IT? 
251 A WE HAVE LOCKERS, SECURING THE LOCKER FOR THE 
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MARTIN TURNER; DIR EXAM BY BYRNE 
ill EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN WHEN HE WOULD HAVE TAKEN CUSTODY OF IT 
2 IN OUR OFFICE. WHEN THEY COME BACK IN FOR THE WORK, THEY GO 
3 TO THE SECURED LOCKERS, REMOVE WHATEVER EVIDENCE HAS BEEN 
4 PLACED IN THE LOCKERS, THEN PUT IT IN THEIR EVIDENCE LOCKER 
5 THAT THEY HAVE ACCESS TO. 
4 Q ARE ALL THOSE LOCKED? 
7 A YES, THEY'RE LOCKERS THAT WE ENTER OUR EVIDENCE 
8 INTO. WE ALL HAVE SEPARATE LOCKERS, SO THERE'S NO MISSING OF 
9 EVIDENCE UNTIL THE CUSTODIAN TAKES THE MATERIAL OUT OF THE 
10 INDIVIDUAL LOCKERS AND PLACES THEM INTO HER LOCKER WHERE 
11 ALL THE EVIDENCE IS HELD. 
12 Q IS THIS THE SAME SCALE? 
13 A YES. 
14 MS. BYRNE: THE STATE WOULD RE-MOVE TO REQUEST 
15 TO HAVE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, AND I'M SPEAKING ABOUT WHAT'S 
16 MARKED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 3. 
17 MR. STEELE: NO OBJECTION. 
1 8
 THE COURT: STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 3 IS ADMITTED. 
19 COUNSEL, IS THIS A GOOD TIME FOR RECESS? 
20 MS. BYRNE: THIS IS. 
2 1
 THE COURT: MEMBERS OF THE JURY, AT THIS TIME WE 
22 WILL TAKE OUR NOON RECESS. I DO ADMONISH YOU THAT YOU ARE 
23 FREE TO GO ABOUT YOUR ACTIVITIES AS YOU SEE FIT. I WOULD ASK 
24 YOU TO RETURN TO THE COURTROOM TODAY BY 2:00 O'CLOCK. 
251 BUT I WOULD ADMONISH YOU: PLEASE DO NOT 
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ANGUS CRS-EXAM BY SHREWSBURY 
1 SCOTT SMOOT, ONE OF THE CRIMINALISTS IN THE LAB. 
2 Q WERE IDENTIFICATION STICKERS ON IT, MARKING NUMBERS 
3 ON IT, TO REFER TO IT, OR TO MAKE REFERENCE BACK TO THIS CASE ON 
4 IT AT THE TIME IT WAS RECEIVED? 
5 A I DID NOT RECEIVE THE EVIDENCE. IF WE CAN LOOK--WHEN 
6 IT'S-WHEN ITEMS ARE-EXCUSE ME, WHEN ITEMS ARE BROUGHT INTO 
7 THE LAB, THEY'RE MARKED WITH OUR CASE NUMBER, AND I CAN SEE 
8 THAT SCOTT'S INITIALS AND OUR CASE NUMBER AND THE DATE IT WAS 
9 RECEIVED ARE ON THIS ITEM. 
10 Q ALL RIGHT. WHAT I'M TRYING TO FIND HERE IS SOME 
11 POSITIVE LINK THAT THAT IS THE MARIJUANA IN QUESTION 
12 CONCERNING THIS CASE. I JUST DON'T-THERE'S NO POSITIVE EVIDENCE 
13 OF THAT. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU CAN OFFER THAT WOULD 
14 CLARIFY? 
15 A LET ME REFER TO MY NOTES. WHEN I ANALYZE AN ITEM, I 
16 WRITE DOWN THE LABEL, WHAT I READ OFF OF THE LABEL. MAYBE 
17 THE POLICE AGENCY CASE NUMBER, THE CASE NUMBER AGENCY, THE 
18 DATE, ANY NUMBERS. AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT I HAVE WRITTEN THE 
19 NUMBER 049400167, WHICH REFERS TO THE HIGHWAY PATROL CASE 
20 NUMBER ON MY NOTES, WHICH MATCHES THE NUMBER ON THE LABEL 
21 HERE. THAT WOULD MAKE SURE IT WAS THE SAME CASE, THAT IT 
22 WOULD CORRELATE TO THE SAME CASE. 
23 MR. SHREWSBURY: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
24 MS. BYRNE: IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR. 
251 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
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K. SHREWSBURY DIR EXAM BY SHREWSBURY 
ill MERELY RAN INTO HIS ARM, AND IT KIND OF TWISTED ME LIKE THAT. 
2 AND I CONTINUED TO RUN ALONG IN A NORTHBOUND 
3 DIRECTION WHERE OTHER OFFICERS WERE SURROUNDING ME. AND 
4 THEY TACKLED ME. BUT THERE WAS NO ASSAULT ON AN OFFICER, ON 
5 OFFICER WRIGHT. 
6 FURTHERMORE, THE OFFICER--THE ONE THAT 
7 HANDCUFFED ME, I BELIEVE HE'S THE ONE THAT SEIZED THE 
8 MARIJUANA. I'M NOT SURE HE'S THE ONE THAT TOOK IT. I KNOW THAT 
9 HE REMOVED THE FANNY PACK OFF OF ME AND LOOKED AT IT. 
10 WHERE IT WENT FROM THERE, I DON'T KNOW. BUT IT 
11 WAS NOT PUT BACK ON MY WAIST. 
12 AND OFFICER TURNER DID NOT TAKE THAT OFF OF MY 
13 WAIST AND TAKE POSSESSION OF THAT OR SEIZE IT. 
14 FURTHERMORE, IT WAS NOT WITH ANY INTENT TO 
15 DISTRIBUTE. IT WAS IN SEPARATE BAGGIES, BECAUSE THAT SCALE, 
16 WHEN YOU WEIGHT IT, IT'S INACCURATE. ANYTIME YOU PUT THOSE 
17 SCALES IN YOUR POCKET, THEY GET BENT OR SOMETHING, AND THE 
18 LITTLE NEEDLE DOES NOT POINT TO AN ACCURATE MEASUREMENT. 
19 IF YOU TAKE FIVE TWENTY-FIVE CENT PIECES AND 
20 WEIGH THEM, IT'S A WAY OF TESTING OF YOUR SCALE, AND THE 
21 CENTERS ON THE SCALE ARE GOING TO WEIGH A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY. 
22 WHAT YOU DO IS YOU TEST IT, YOU PUT EQUAL 
23 MEASUREMENTS IN IT, SO YOU CAN GET AN ACCURATE MEASUREMENT. 
24 IT WAS NOT THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
251 FURTHERMORE, THE PARTICULAR MARIJUANA THAT IS 
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1 PROCEEDINGS STOOD IN RECESS; AFTER WHICH, AT 
2 THE APPROXIMATE HOUR OF 4:45 P.M., THE FOLLOWING 
3 PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD IN CAMERA, OUT OF THE 
4 PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE JURY, BUT WITHIN 
5 THE PRESENCE AND HEARING OF THE DEFENDANT:) 
6 THE COURT: THE COURT HAS GONE OVER THE 
7 INSTRUCTIONS WITH COUNSEL AND THEY HAVE OBJECTIONS WHICH 
8 THEY WISH TO MAKE FOR THE RECORD, TO ANY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
9 OR NOT GIVEN. 
10 MS. BYRNE: THE STATE HAS NO OBJECTIONS AS TO 
11 INSTRUCTIONS WHICH THE COURT HAS DECIDED TO GIVE OR NOT GIVE. 
12 MR. STEELE: MR. SHREWSBURY IS TRYING TO TELL ME 
13 ONE THING, YOUR HONOR. 
14 MR. SHREWSBURY: I'D LIKE TO OBJECT TO THIS ONE 
15 HERE. 
16 THE COURT: TALK TO COUNSEL. 
17 MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE THESE 
18 OBJECTIONS. NO. 1 STATES THAT "THAT OPINION EVIDENCE CAN BE 
19 FROM EXPERT WITNESSES." WE OBJECT TO IT, AND WHAT WE NEED--
20 WHAT WE WOULD ASK FOR IS SOMETHING TO MAKE IT MUCH CLEARER 
21 THAT THIS IS OPINION AS OPPOSED TO FACT, AND THAT WE-WELL--
22 MR. SHREWSBURY: AN OPINION IS A BELIEF AND A 
23 BELIEF IS AN ADMISSION TO A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE. IT'S NOT BEYOND 
24 A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
251 MR. STEELE: I THINK I WOULD HAVE TO DEFER TO MY 
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ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 3 
The Utah Constitution provides for the following: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberty. (Article I Section 1). 
and 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of a free government. (Article I Section 27). 
and 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. (Article 1 Section 4). 
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